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I. INTRODUCTION
Anyone familiar with the Supreme Court’s work the last quarter
century knows that Justice Anthony M. Kennedy has cast the decisive
vote more often than any other Justice.1 He has been in the middle of
decisionmaking because he is not in the conservative bloc—Chief
Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito—or the liberal
bloc—Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan.2 For this
reason, a number of scholars have analyzed his reasoning in various
fields of law,3 and efforts have been made to find arguments that might
attract his favor.4

1. See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Kennedy Court: October Term 2005, 9 GREEN
BAG 2d 335, 335 (2006) (“Justice Anthony Kennedy is clearly the swing vote and likely
will determine the outcome of most high profile cases so long as these remain the nine
Justices . . . .”); R. Randall Kelso & Charles D. Kelso, Swing Votes on the Current
Supreme Court: The Joint Opinion in Casey and Its Progeny, 29 PEPP. L. REV. 637, 638–
39 (2002). Justice Kennedy has been in the majority in most recent cases decided by a
5–4 vote. See, e.g., Richard G. Wilkins et al., Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 2007
Term, 37 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 287, 299, 309 tbl.10 (2010); Richard G. Wilkins et al.,
Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 2006 Term, 36 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 51, 62, 72 tbl.10
(2008).
2. Of course, the seats of Justices Sotomayor and Kagan were until recently filled,
respectively, by Justices Souter and Stevens, themselves members of the liberal bloc.
3. See, e.g., FRANK J. COLUCCI, JUSTICE KENNEDY’S JURISPRUDENCE: THE FULL
AND NECESSARY MEANING OF LIBERTY (2009).
4. See, for example, David S. Cohen, Justice Kennedy’s Gendered World, 59 S.C.
L. REV. 673 (2008), and sources cited therein.
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Justice Kennedy has been in a position to cast many decisive votes
because his style of deciding avoids the extremes of styles used by other
Justices. At one extreme are the formalists, such as Justices Scalia, Thomas,
and Alito, who give great weight to literal text.5 Near that view are
Holmesians, who are characterized by deference to government action
and concern for underlying purposes of the law.6 Currently this describes
Chief Justice Roberts, as it did Chief Justice Rehnquist, and of course,
Justice Holmes himself.7 At the other extreme are the instrumentalists,
such as former Justices Douglas, Marshall, and Stevens, and current Justices
Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan.8 They pay close attention to
alternative social policy consequences of decisions.9
In contrast, although Justice Kennedy bases his constitutional decisions
on the traditional factors of judicial decisionmaking—constitutional text,
history, legislative and executive practice, precedent, and analysis of
consequences10—the foundation for his opinions is a set of basic principles
he finds embodied in the Constitution. Under this view, Justices give
great weight to these general principles underlying the law. This style
may be called natural law, based on the eighteenth-century Enlightenment
natural law belief that underlying general principles were a given part of
the rule of law and the Constitution.11 This was the style of interpretation of
early Justices on the Supreme Court, including Chief Justice Marshall
and Justice Story.12 Modern Justices who have reasoned this way and

5. See generally CHARLES D. KELSO & R. RANDALL KELSO, THE PATH OF
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 9 (2007 & Supp. 2011) [hereinafter KELSO & KELSO, PATH];
Charles D. Kelso & R. Randall Kelso, Judicial Decision-Making and Judicial Review:
The State of the Debate, Circa 2009, 112 W. VA. L. REV. 351, 355 (2010) [hereinafter
Kelso & Kelso, Judicial Decision-Making].
6. KELSO & KELSO, PATH, supra note 5, § 10.1.
7. Id. § 10; Kelso & Kelso, Judicial Decision-Making, supra note 5, at 355–56.
8. KELSO & KELSO, PATH, supra note 5, § 11.1.
9. Id. § 11; Kelso & Kelso, Judicial Decision-Making, supra note 5, at 354–55.
10. On these traditional factors, see PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY
OF THE CONSTITUTION (1982); PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1991);
Saikrishna B. Prakash, Overcoming the Constitution, 91 GEO. L.J. 407, 407–12 (2003)
(reviewing RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION (2001)).
11. See generally Terry Brennan, Natural Rights and the Constitution: The Original
“Original Intent,” 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 965 (1992); Edward S. Corwin, The
“Higher Law” Background of American Constitutional Law (pts. 1 & 2), 42 HARV. L.
REV. 149, 365 (1928–1929); Suzanna Sherry, The Founders’ Unwritten Constitution, 54
U. CHI. L. REV. 1127 (1987).
12. See JAMES MCCLELLAN, JOSEPH STORY AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION:
A STUDY IN POLITICAL AND LEGAL THOUGHT 65, 85–86, 92–98 (1971); David M. O’Brien,
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who have at one time or another been regarded as swing votes are Justices
Powell, O’Connor, Souter, and Kennedy.13
Because Justice Kennedy has often been the controlling vote on the
Court, these principles have led him to have had particular impact on the
Court’s development of constitutional doctrine in three areas of the law:
aspects of personal liberty, freedom of speech, and structural issues of
federalism and separation of powers. In a previous article, we discussed
Justice Kennedy’s opinions relating to liberty.14 A forthcoming article
discusses Justice Kennedy’s opinions on structural issues.15 In this
Article, we discuss the constitutional jurisprudence of Justice Kennedy
with respect to freedom of speech. This Article identifies the basic
principles that have led Justice Kennedy to take a very protective stance
toward freedom of speech, as weighed against the various government
interests put forward as justifications for regulating speech. We then
discuss Justice Kennedy’s most significant majority, concurring, and
dissenting opinions regarding freedom of speech.
II. A SUMMARY OF JUSTICE KENNEDY’S ANALYSIS OF
FREE SPEECH REVIEW
A. Basic Considerations: Three Basic Principles
By our count, Justice Kennedy has written twenty significant free
speech opinions for the Court, fifteen significant concurring opinions,
and seven significant dissents. From these opinions, three general
principles emerge—supporting political freedom, supporting individual
autonomy, and protecting freedom to teach, learn, and innovate. Based
on eighteenth-century Enlightenment philosophy,16 these three principles
explain why Justice Kennedy believes that freedom of speech was
intended to receive and deserves much protection from action by all
branches of state and federal government.

The Framers’ Muse on Republicanism, the Supreme Court, and Pragmatic Constitutional
Interpretivism, 53 REV. POL. 251, 279 (1991).
13. See generally KELSO & KELSO, PATH, supra note 5, § 12.1; Kelso & Kelso,
Judicial Decision-Making, supra note 5, at 356; Kelso & Kelso, supra note 1, at 638–39.
14. Charles D. Kelso & Randall Kelso, The Constitutional Jurisprudence of
Justice Kennedy on Liberty, 9 DARTMOUTH L.J. 29 (2011).
15. Charles D. Kelso & R. Randall Kelso, The Constitutional Jurisprudence of
Justice Kennedy on Federalism and Separation of Powers (2012) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with authors).
16. See generally ROGERS M. SMITH, LIBERALISM AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 92–95 (1985) (discussing eighteenth-century liberalism and the freedom of speech
in terms of “freedom of conscience,” which was used to support “personal liberty” and
“intellectual progress,” as well as the “political function” of freedom of speech to expose
the “[m]ischief ” of politicians).
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Justice Kennedy’s most speech-protective language appears in Republican
Party of Minnesota v. White.17 In White, he said in a concurring opinion
that “content-based speech restrictions . . . should be invalidated without
inquiry into narrow tailoring or compelling interests” unless they “fall
within any traditional exception” to free speech doctrine, such as obscenity,
defamation, words tantamount to an act otherwise criminal, speech
impairing some other constitutional right, an incitement to lawless action, or
speech calculated to bring about imminent harm that the state has power
to regulate.18 The basis for this was identified as “the principle that
unabridged speech is the foundation of political freedom.”19
Justice Kennedy has echoed this support for effective democracy in a
number of opinions. He has declared the following:
(1) “The First Amendment guarantees our citizens the right to
judge for themselves the most effective means for the
expression of political views and to decide for themselves
which entities to trust as reliable speakers.”20
(2) “The right of citizens to inquire, to hear, to speak, and to use
information to reach consensus is a precondition to enlightened
self-government and a necessary means to protect it.”21
(3) “Political speech is ‘indispensable to decisionmaking in a
democracy, and this is no less true because the speech comes
from a corporation rather than an individual.’”22
(4) “The whole theory of viewpoint neutrality is that minority
views are treated with the same respect as are majority
views.”23
(5) “Political parties advance a shared political belief, [and] to
do so they often must speak through their candidates.”24

17. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 793 (2002) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
18. Id. (quoting Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime
Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 124 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
19. Id. at 794.
20. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 286 (2003) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part), overruled in part by Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
21. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 898.
22. Id. at 904 (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 (1978)).
23. Bd. of Regents v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 235 (2000).
24. Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 587 (2000) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
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(6) “[T]he right to speak fosters the public exchange of ideas
that is integral to deliberative democracy as well as to the
whole realm of ideas and human affairs.”25
(7) “[T]he First Amendment has its fullest and most urgent
application to speech uttered during a campaign for political
office.”26
In addition to supporting political freedom, free speech gives protection
in various circumstances, according to Justice Kennedy, because of its
relation to personal autonomy. The importance of autonomy to Justice
Kennedy was made clear in the notable joint opinion in Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, where he joined with
Justices O’Connor and Souter to emphasize that personal autonomy is an
important constitutional value.27 The opinion said, “At the heart of
liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning,
of the universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these
matters could not define the attributes of personhood were they formed
under compulsion of the State.”28 Justice Kennedy elaborated on that
29
idea in Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC. There, he said, “At
the heart of the First Amendment lies the principle that each person
should decide for himself or herself the ideas and beliefs deserving of
expression, consideration, and adherence. Our political system and cultural
life rest upon this ideal.”30
Justice Kennedy has stressed the importance of personal autonomy as
a principle supporting the First Amendment in a number of passages.
For example, he has written:
Government action that stifles speech on account of its message, or that
requires the utterance of a particular message favored by the Government,
contravenes this essential right. Laws of this sort pose the inherent risk that
the Government seeks not to advance a legitimate regulatory goal, but to suppress
unpopular ideas or information or manipulate the public debate through
coercion rather than persuasion.31

Again, referring to attempts by the government to control a person’s
private thoughts, he wrote, “First Amendment freedoms are most in danger
when the government seeks to control thought or to justify its laws for

25. Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. 2488, 2495 (2011).
26. Nev. Comm’n on Ethics v. Carrigan, 131 S. Ct. 2343, 2353 (2011) (quoting Eu
v. S.F. Cnty. Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 223 (1989)).
27. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 843, 851 (1992) (joint
opinion of O’Connor, Kennedy, & Souter, JJ.).
28. Id. at 851.
29. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994).
30. Id.
31. Id.
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that impermissible end. The right to think is the beginning of freedom,
and speech must be protected from the government because speech is the
beginning of thought.”32 As a result, he has affirmed, “As a general
principle, the First Amendment bars the government from dictating what
we see or read or speak or hear.”33
A third basic principle served by the First Amendment is the protection of
freedom to teach, learn, and innovate. Justice Kennedy has said the
following:
The first danger to liberty lies in granting the State the power to examine
publications to determine whether or not they are based on some ultimate idea
and, if so, for the State to classify them. The second, and corollary, danger is
to speech from the chilling of individual thought and expression. That danger
is especially real in the University setting, where the State acts against a
background and tradition of thought and experiment that is at the center of our
intellectual and philosophic tradition.34

B. Doctrinal Issues Raised in Free Speech Cases
The impact of these three basic principles has been developed in Justice
Kennedy’s opinions. For an introduction, it may be useful to provide a
summary of the analytic structure of free speech doctrine that emerges
from considering his free speech opinions.
One doctrinal aspect of free speech cases is whether the speech being
regulated occurs on private property, in a public forum, or in a nonpublic
forum owned by the government. Naturally, government attempts to
regulate speech on individuals’ private property or in public forums are
much more difficult to justify and typically trigger a more heightened
standard of scrutiny than government regulations on property owned by
the government that is generally not open to the public. The leading
case on what standard of review to apply in nonpublic forums is Perry
Education Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n.35 Decided in 1983,
Perry held that a school could reserve access to an interschool mail
system and teacher mailboxes for the union certified as the exclusive
representative of the teachers.36 After summarizing and organizing the
precedents, Justice White pointed out that strict scrutiny applied to

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 253 (2002).
Id. at 245.
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 835 (1995).
Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
Id. at 47–54.
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content-based exclusions from a public forum or from public property
that the state has opened for use by the public as a place for expressive
activity, and to government attempts to regulate individual speech on an
individual’s own nonpublic private property.37 However, with regard to
non-public-forum property owned by the government, the state can impose
time, place, and manner restrictions, and also may reserve the forum for
its intended purposes, “as long as the regulation on speech is reasonable
and not an effort to suppress expression merely because public officials
oppose the speaker’s views.”38 As discussed in Part III of this Article,
Justice Kennedy’s approach to whether a forum is public or nonpublic is
more protective of free speech than that of many conservatives.39
A second doctrinal issue is whether a regulation is content-based or
content-neutral. If a law is content-based and does not deal with one of
the exceptional situations where a reduced standard of review applies,
such as advocacy of illegal action likely to occur, true threats, fighting
words, obscenity, child pornography, or defamation,40 Justice Kennedy
has called for automatic invalidation, or at least for strict scrutiny. For
example, in Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the New York State
Crime Victims Board, the Court adopted a strict scrutiny approach to
content-based regulations of speech.41 Concurring in the case, Justice
Kennedy noted that this adoption of the equal protection strict scrutiny
approach in a First Amendment case was not required by prior precedents
and that although “the compelling interest inquiry has found its way into
our First Amendment jurisprudence of late . . . the Court appears to have
adopted this formulation in First Amendment cases by accident rather
than as the result of a considered judgment.”42 In contrast to the Court’s
strict scrutiny approach, Justice Kennedy preferred an absolutist approach,
which would prevent the state from any content-based regulation of fully
protected speech, without regard to a compelling-governmental-interest
analysis.43
This perspective has led to his support for invalidating many laws or
their application or for requiring the government to supply more
justification in terms of a substantial or compelling objective, or closer
tailoring considering available alternatives. The possibility of satisfying
37. Id. at 45–46.
38. Id. at 46 (citing U.S. Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass’ns, 453
U.S. 114, 131 n.7 (1981)).
39. See infra Part III.
40. On these exceptions, see generally G. STONE ET AL., THE FIRST AMENDMENT
19–108, 135–282 (3d ed. 2008).
41. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502
U.S. 105, 118 (1991).
42. Id. at 125 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
43. Id. at 126–27.
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strict scrutiny depends on the identification of compelling government
interests to support the government regulation, whether the government
regulation is directly related to advancing that end, and whether the
government has used the least restrictive—or as it is sometimes phrased,
the least burdensome—effective alternative to regulate the speech.44
Cases involving content-based regulations are discussed in Part IV of
this Article.45
In other cases, the Court has noted that the regulations are contentneutral. In these cases, the Court applies intermediate review. The use
of intermediate scrutiny for content-neutral regulations of speech or
reasonable time, place, and manner regulations of speech is best
illustrated in the 1989 case of Ward v. Rock Against Racism.46 The Court
held in Ward that New York City did not deprive musicians of First
Amendment rights by insisting that bandshell performers in Central Park
use sound amplification equipment and a sound technician provided by
the city.47 For the Court, Justice Kennedy first held that the regulation
was content-neutral because two of its justifications, controlling noise in
the park and avoiding undue intrusion into residential areas, had nothing
to do with content.48 Regarding the third justification, the city’s interest
in ensuring the quality of sound at park events, the challengers argued
that the city was “seeking to assert artistic control.”49 Justice Kennedy
replied that “the city requires its technician to defer to the wishes of
event sponsors concerning sound mix,” and the record indicated that
“the city’s equipment and its sound technician could meet all of the
standards requested by the performers.”50 In most cases of content
neutrality, the issue discussed by Justice Kennedy was the way in which
the intermediate standard of review applied to the facts, and in most
cases he upheld the regulation. These cases are discussed in Part V of
this Article.51

44. As the Court stated in Simon & Schuster, to justify its “content-based” regulation of
speech “the State must show that its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state
interest and is narrowly drawn to achieve that end.” Id. at 117–18 (quoting Ark. Writers’
Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 231 (1987)).
45. See infra Part IV.
46. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989).
47. Id. at 789–90.
48. Id. at 792.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 792–93.
51. See infra Part V.
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There follows a close look at cases in which Justice Kennedy’s opinions
support the above summary analysis. Many of the cases deal with
legislative efforts to regulate the content of what goes on in a political
campaign. Next in terms of quantity are cases reviewing content
regulations aimed at protecting children from sexual matters. There are
also a number of cases involving content-based regulations that do not
involve politics and that bring into play concerns about lawyer behavior,
business activity, or compelled speech.
Most of Justice Kennedy’s ideas have been embodied in majority
opinions. His concurring opinions tend to protect free speech by stating
limits or qualifications on what he believes the Court has held. His
dissenting opinions in free speech cases are typically objections to the
Court upholding a regulation of speech.
III. PUBLIC VERSUS NONPUBLIC FORUM ANALYSIS
In International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee,
Justice Kennedy concurred with the judgment allowing an airport to bar
solicitation for the immediate payment of money on its premises.52
However, he disagreed with the majority’s view that the airport was not
a public forum simply because the airport authority considered the
purpose of its terminals to be the facilitation of air travel.53 As discussed
below, because of changes in Court membership since the Lee case was
decided, Justice Kennedy’s approach to determining a public versus
nonpublic forum is likely the majority approach on the Court today.
In Lee, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for the majority that a public
airport terminal was not a public forum and could reasonably ban the
repetitive solicitation of money within its terminals.54 With respect to
the nature of the forum, Chief Justice Rehnquist said that the decision to
create a public forum is “made ‘by intentionally opening a nontraditional
forum for public discourse.’”55 He further commented that “the tradition
of airport activity does not demonstrate that airports have historically
been [opened] for speech activity,” and that airport operators have
frequently objected in litigation to such activity.56 It was not persuasive
that speech activity has “occurred at various ‘transportation nodes’ such
as rail stations” because those nodes have traditionally had private

52. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 693 (1992)
(Kennedy, J., concurring).
53. Id. at 696–97.
54. Id. at 679, 684–85 (majority opinion).
55. Id. at 680 (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473
U.S. 788, 802 (1985)).
56. Id. at 680–81.
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ownership, and the relevant unit in the case was the airport, not nodes
generally.57 Airports are commercial enterprises whose management
considered their purpose “to be the facilitation of passenger air travel.”58
Therefore, only a reasonableness standard applicable to nonpublic fora
needed to be applied.59 Viewing the case against a background of
substantial congestion, Chief Justice Rehnquist, with Justices White, Scalia,
and Thomas, upheld both a ban on solicitation and a ban on literature
distribution, including leafleting.60 Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that
allowing solicitation on outside sidewalks, as provided by the airport
managers, gives sufficient access to an area universally traveled.61
Justice O’Connor agreed that the airport was not a public forum because
no intent had been expressed to open airports to the types of expression
there involved.62 She said, however, that the reasonableness inquiry is
whether the restrictions are consistent with the multipurpose environment
deliberately created.63 She further wrote that the solicitation of money
impedes the normal flow of travel and risks confrontation with a person
asking for money.64 Thus, that ban was reasonable.65 However, she said
the ban on leafleting was not reasonable given the minimal disruption
caused by a person giving out information.66
Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices Blackmun, Stevens, and Souter,
said that an airport is a public forum.67 Focusing more on the objective
characteristics of the property, Justice Kennedy concluded that public
forum status should be given to property if its “physical characteristics . . .
and . . . actual public access and uses . . . permitted by the government
indicate that expressive activity would be appropriate and compatible
with those uses.”68 Under this test, airport terminals are a public forum
because their “public spaces . . . are broad, public thoroughfares full of
people and lined with stores and other commercial activities.”69 Further,
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id. at 681.
Id. at 682.
Id. at 683.
Id. at 683–84.
Id. at 684–85.
Id. at 686 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
Id. at 687.
Id. at 689.
Id. at 689–90.
Id. at 690–92.
Id. at 693 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
Id. at 698.
Id. at 700.
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there had been no showing that any real impediments to the airport’s use
could not be cured with reasonable time, place, and manner regulations.70
Given the current membership on the Court, this approach would likely
be adopted by a majority of Justices, composed of Justices Kennedy,
Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan.71
Applying intermediate scrutiny appropriate for content-neutral
regulations in a public forum, Justice Kennedy concluded that the ban
on solicitation for the receipt of money was valid as a time, place, and
manner restriction.72 This behavior creates a risk of fraud and duress,
and there are ample alternatives because the solicitor can give a
preaddressed envelope.73 However, the ban on distributing or selling
literature was invalid.74 The government had less interest in regulation,
and the danger of fraud was more limited.75
Justices Souter, Blackmun, and Stevens thought that both bans were
invalid.76 Regarding solicitation of money for immediate payment, the
claim for duress was weak, and there was no evidence of coercive
conduct.77 There was almost no evidence of fraud.78 Ample alternative
channels for solicitation did not exist because the “distribution of
preaddressed envelopes [was] unlikely to be much of an alternative.”79
Reflecting more the “objective” characteristics of the property approach
found in Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Lee, lower federal courts
since Lee have held that a private sidewalk encircling a privately owned
sports arena complex that appears like any public sidewalk and that is
used as a public thoroughfare is a public forum.80 Using the same approach,
lower federal courts have also held that a mass transit agency’s
acceptance of advertisements on a wide range of topics under contracts
for display in its stations and vehicles for the purpose of raising revenue
made such areas designated public fora and triggered public forum review.81

70. Id. at 701.
71. This prediction is based on the fact that liberal Justices have tended to adopt
the broader view of public forum doctrine, as Justices Blackmun, Stevens, and Souter did
in Lee, see supra text accompanying notes 67–70, and that Justices Ginsburg, Breyer,
Sotomayor, and Kagan would likely adopt a similar liberal view.
72. Lee, 505 U.S. at 703 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
73. Id. at 705–08.
74. Id. at 708.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 709–11 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
77. Id. at 713.
78. Id. at 713–14.
79. Id. at 715.
80. United Church of Christ v. Gateway Econ. Dev. Corp., 383 F.3d 449, 451–53
(6th Cir. 2004).
81. Christ’s Bride Ministries, Inc. v. Se. Pa. Trans. Auth., 148 F.3d 242, 247–55
(3d Cir. 1998).
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Justice Kennedy elaborated on public and nonpublic forum analysis in
Arkansas Educational Television Commission v. Forbes.82 In Forbes,
Justice Kennedy noted in his majority opinion that the Court had recognized
three types of fora: the traditional public forum; the public forum created
by government designation, which may be for the general public or for a
particular class of speakers; and the nonpublic forum.83 He pointed out
that a public forum is not created where the government does nothing
more “than reserve eligibility for access to the forum to a particular class
of speakers.”84 Thus, a candidate debate sponsored by a state-owned public
television station was a nonpublic forum where the station had extended
invitations only to candidates who had substantial support.85 For
this reason, there was no violation of the First Amendment in limiting
the debate to such candidates where that was a reasonable viewpointneutral exercise of journalistic judgment.86
IV. CONTENT-BASED REGULATIONS
A. Opinions in Which Justice Kennedy Voted To
Invalidate a Regulation
Justice Kennedy’s most significant free speech opinions involving
content-based regulations involve four kinds of free speech cases:
(1) political speech; (2) regulation of sexually oriented materials;
(3) viewpoint discrimination cases; and (4) business and commercial
speech cases.
1. Political Speech
Justice Kennedy has written more opinions on political speech than on
any other free speech area. He has voted to invalidate the challenged law,
its application, or both in all but two of these cases. The cases on political
speech in which Justice Kennedy has written a majority or concurring
opinion in opposition to a government regulation deal with campaign
financing; election procedures, including limits on access to the ballot
and limits on candidates’ speech; political protests such as burning flags
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666 (1998).
Id. at 677–78.
Id. at 679.
Id. at 680.
Id. at 682–83.
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as a form of political speech; and political affiliations of government
employees.
a. Campaign Financing
In Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, a 6–3 majority held that
Congress could regulate corporate contributions to political campaigns.87
Justice Kennedy dissented, saying that limits on electioneering because
of the speaker’s corporate identity should not be upheld.88 Twenty years
later he was able to write for the Court, in Citizens United v. FEC, that
Austin was overruled.89 In Citizens United, the most important case in
which Justice Kennedy has penned a First Amendment opinion for the
Court, there was a clash between the interests of corporations in free
speech related to elections and the government’s interest in avoiding the
distorting influence of wealth, preventing corruption, and protecting
shareholders.90 A federal statute barred corporations from making
independent expenditures that referred to a clearly identified candidate
within thirty days of a primary election or within sixty days of a general
election for public office.91 In his opinion for a 5–4 Court, Justice Kennedy
said that the proper standard of review was strict scrutiny, which required
the government to prove that the restriction furthered a compelling
interest and was narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.92 At this level
of review, deference is not given to legislative judgments on the existence
of facts. Here the government had not identified a compelling interest, said
Justice Kennedy, because “First Amendment protection[] do[es] not depend
on the speaker’s ‘financial ability to engage in public discussion’[;] . . .
independent expenditures . . . do not give rise to corruption or the
appearance of corruption,” and if a shareholder protection theory were
adopted it would give the government power to restrict the political
speech of media corporations.93 Further, there was “little evidence of
abuse that cannot be [protected against] by shareholders ‘through the
procedures of corporate democracy.’”94
87. Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660–61 (1990),
overruled by Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
88. Id. at 695–96, 699 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
89. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876.
90. Id. at 903.
91. Id. at 887 (citing 2 U.S.C. § 441b (2000)).
92. Id. at 911.
93. Id. at 883–84 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 49 (1976)).
94. Id. at 911 (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 794
(1978)); see Matthew Lambert, Beyond Corporate Speech: Corporate Powers in a
Federalist System, 37 RUTGERS L. REC. 20 (2010) (quoting Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at
889) (explaining that the Court in Citizens United rejected the argument that political
speech of corporations or other associations should be treated differently under the First
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The background of principles for Justice Kennedy’s rejection of the
government’s theories on compelling interests appears in several of Justice
Kennedy’s general observations in the case. With respect to judgments on
the accuracy and implementations of the proposed corporately supported
distribution of a video about Hillary Clinton, which had given rise to the
cases, Justice Kennedy said,
The First Amendment underwrites the freedom to experiment and to create in
the realm of thought and speech. Citizens must be free to use new forms, and
new forums, for the expression of ideas. The civic discourse belongs to the
people, and the Government may not prescribe the means used to conduct it.95

With respect to making it a crime for corporations to engage in
political speech shortly before an election, Justice Kennedy said:
Modern day movies, television comedies, or skits on Youtube.com might
portray public officials or public policies in unflattering ways. Yet if a covered
transmission during the blackout period creates the background for candidate
endorsement or opposition, a felony occurs solely because a corporation, other
than an exempt media corporation, has made the “purchase, payment, distribution,
loan, advance, deposit, or gift of money or anything of value” in order to
engage in political speech. 2 U.S.C. § 431(9)(A)(i). Speech would be
suppressed in the realm where its necessity is most evident: in the public
dialogue preceding a real election. Governments are often hostile to speech,
but under our law and our tradition it seems stranger than fiction for our
Government to make this political speech a crime. Yet this is the statute’s
purpose and design.96

In addition to Austin,97 Justice Kennedy’s Citizens United decision
overruled McConnell v. FEC.98 Those cases had upheld limits on
electioneering communications because of the speaker’s corporate
identity.99 In each of them, Justice Kennedy had penned a dissent.100 He
said in Citizens United that stare decisis did not require continued
Amendment); Stephan Stohler, One Person, One Vote, One Dollar? Campaign Finance,
Elections, and Elite Democratic Theory, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1257, 1276 n.105 (2010)
(“[R]esources may make a corporation a formidable political presence, even though the
power of the corporation may be no reflection of the power of its ideas.” (quoting FEC v.
Mass. Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238, 258 (1986))).
95. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 917 (quoting McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93,
341 (2003) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), overruled by Citizens
United, 130 S. Ct. 876).
96. Id.
97. Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990), overruled by
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876.
98. McConnell, 540 U.S. 93.
99. Austin, 494 U.S. at 666; McConnell, 540 U.S. at 230.
100. Austin, 494 U.S. at 695; McConnell, 540 U.S. at 286.
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acceptance of the earlier cases because they were not well-reasoned in
abandoning free speech principles and had been undermined by various
circumventions, and because no serious reliance interests were at stake.101
The statutes at issue in Citizens United included 2 U.S.C. § 441d, a
disclaimer requirement to indicate who is responsible for the content of
any advertisement.102 A related section, 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(1), also included
a disclosure requirement for any person spending more than $10,000 on
electioneering communications within a calendar year.103 Justice Kennedy
found “no constitutional impediment to the application of [those contentneutral requirements even] to a movie broadcast via video-on-demand
[because] there [had] been no showing that . . . these requirements would
impose a chill on speech or expression.”104
As frequently occurs, Justice Kennedy’s view was in the middle of
extremes. Justice Thomas joined all but Part IV of Justice Kennedy’s
opinion, where the Court upheld disclosure, disclaimer, and reporting
requirements.105 Thomas pointed to a number of examples where persons
whose names and addresses were disclosed, as required by law, were
subjected to attacks and left vulnerable to retaliation from elected
officials.106 He said that persons should have a right to anonymous
speech and the possibility of bringing an as-applied action would require
substantial litigation over an extended time during which there would be
101. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 911–13. For Justice Kennedy, factors that weigh
toward overruling a case include the following: (1) the precedent is unworkable in
practice; (2) the precedent creates an inconsistency or incoherence in the law; (3) a
changed understanding of facts has undermined the factual basis of the precedent; (4) the
precedent represents a substantially wrong or substantially unjust interpretation of the
Constitution, often because the opinion represents unsound reasoning; or (5) the
precedent raises concerns about a commitment to the “rule of law.” See Planned
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 855–69 (1992) (joint opinion of
O’Connor, Kennedy, & Souter, JJ.); see also Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 358–63
(2009) (Alito, J., dissenting) (articulating the factors that support overturning precedent
in a dissent joined by Justice Kennedy). Factors that favor following a precedent
include: (1) the precedent is “settled law,” or (2) there has been “substantial reliance” on
the precedent. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 233–34 (1995) (“It
is worth pointing out the difference between the applications of stare decisis in this case
and in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey. Casey explained how
considerations of stare decisis inform the decision whether to overrule a long-established
precedent that has become integrated into the fabric of the law [settled law]. Overruling
precedent of that kind naturally may have consequences for ‘the ideal of the rule of law.’
In addition, such precedent is likely to have engendered substantial reliance, as was true
in Casey itself.” (citations omitted) (quoting and citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 854, 856)).
See generally R. Randall Kelso & Charles D. Kelso, How the Supreme Court Is Dealing
with Precedents in Constitutional Cases, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 973, 990–96 (1996).
102. 2 U.S.C. § 441d(a) (2006).
103. Id. § 434(f)(1).
104. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 916.
105. Id. at 979 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
106. Id. at 980–81.
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a risk of chilling speech. He also noted the need for prompt judicial
action was increasing with the ability of the Internet to give wide publicity
to revealed individuals.107 Justice Thomas added, “I cannot endorse a
view of the First Amendment that subjects citizens of this Nation to
death threats, ruined careers, damaged or defaced property, or preemptive and threatening warning letters as the price for engaging in core
political speech, the primary object of First Amendment protection.”108
Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor,
dissented from the Court’s conclusion regarding 2 U.S.C. § 441b.109
Justice Stevens claimed that stare decisis had been inappropriately departed
from because Austin had long been relied upon by state legislatures, and
the case had not been proved unworkable.110 Regarding consequences,
Justice Stevens insisted that there was plenty of evidence supporting the
reasonableness of Congress’s concern to deal with corruption, distortion,
and shareholder protection.111 Justice Stevens said the fact that corporations
“have no consciences, no beliefs, no feelings, [and] no thoughts [or]
desires” is a reminder that they themselves are not “‘We the People’ by
whom and for whom our Constitution was established.”112 He also noted
that the majority view was contrary to long recognition by the people of
the need to prevent corporations from undermining self-government.113
However, these four dissenting Justices did agree with Justice Kennedy
that the disclaimer and disclosure requirements were constitutional.114
In Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. FEC, the
Court held that the First Amendment prohibited application of the
Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 to campaign contribution limits
on expenditures a political party makes “independently, without
coordination with any candidate.”115 Justice Kennedy added that a political
party’s spending in cooperation with a candidate was “indistinguishable
in substance from expenditures by the candidate or [the candidate’s]

107. Id.
108. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S.
93, 264 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
109. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 929 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
110. Id. at 938–40.
111. Id. at 960–79.
112. Id. at 972.
113. Id. at 948–53.
114. Id. at 886, 913–16 (majority opinion).
115. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604, 608 (1996).
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campaign committee,” and for that reason should be protected by the
First Amendment.116
In Randall v. Sorrell, a plurality opinion said that Vermont’s
expenditure limits for state office candidates were invalid under Buckley
v. Valeo.117 Justice Kennedy, concurring in the judgment, said that the
primary justifications for the expenditure limits were not significantly
different from Congress’s rationale for the Buckley limits, and reiterated
his own “skepticism regarding that system and its operation.”118
b. Elections
The Court held in California Democratic Party v. Jones that creating a
blanket primary violated the freedom of speech and freedom of
association by depriving members of a political party the right to choose
its nominees.119 Concurring, Justice Kennedy added that “[p]olitical
parties advance a shared political belief [and] to do so they . . . must
speak through their candidates.”120
In Cook v. Gralike, the Court struck down a state law that sought to
establish on ballots for federal offices whether a candidate opposed term
limits.121 Justice Kennedy added that the basic principle was that the
Constitution was established by the people themselves and that the states
may not act as intermediaries between the people and the federal
government.122 This decision thus protected the right of a candidate to
decide what speech to make to voters on the issue of term limits, rather
than having the state compel speech on that topic.
In Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, the Court held that a law
that barred candidates for judicial office from announcing their views on
disputed legal and political issues did not pass strict scrutiny and thus
violated the First Amendment.123 Justice Kennedy agreed but added in a
concurrence that “content-based speech restrictions that do not fall
within any traditional exception should be invalidated without [even]
inquir[ing] into narrow tailoring or compelling government interests.”124
It is not clear whether he intended this statement to be limited to election

116. Id. at 630 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
117. Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 236 (2006).
118. Id. at 264–65 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
119. Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 585–86 (2000).
120. Id. at 587 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
121. Cook v. Gralike, 531 U.S. 510, 525–26 (2001) (holding that disclosure of a
candidate’s position on term limits violated the Elections Clause).
122. Id. at 528 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
123. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 788 (2002).
124. Id. at 793 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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cases or whether, as it literally appears, he was announcing a general
principle for all content-based speech restrictions.
In two election cases where the majority upheld a state election
regulation, Justice Kennedy did not find himself in the majority. In
Burdick v. Takushi, the Court upheld Hawaii’s ban on write-in voting.125
Justice Kennedy, dissenting, said this imposed a “significant burden on
the right of voters . . . to vote for the candidates of their choice.”126
In Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, the Court held that the
approval in Buckley of contribution limits respecting candidates for federal
office should extend to such limits on candidates for state offices.127 Justice
Kennedy, dissenting, said that respect for the First Amendment, plus
unfortunate results following Buckley, should bar this extension.128
c. Political Protest by Flag Burning
In Texas v. Johnson, Justice Kennedy concurred in a 5–4 refusal to
allow Texas to convict a political protester for desecrating a U.S. flag by
burning it.129 Justice Kennedy said that the decision was not easy for
him in view of the sacrifices made in the name of the flag, but “the fact
remains that his acts were speech, in both the technical and the
fundamental meaning of the Constitution.”130 Justice Kennedy further
explained his position:
The hard fact is that sometimes we must make decisions we do not like. We
make them because they are right, right in the sense that the law and the
Constitution, as we see them, compel the result. . . . Though symbols often are
what we ourselves make of them, the flag is constant in expressing beliefs
Americans share, beliefs in law and peace and that freedom which sustains the
human spirit. The case here today forces recognition of the costs to which
those beliefs commit us. It is poignant but fundamental that the flag protects
those who hold it in contempt.131

Congress reacted to Texas v. Johnson by enacting a statute that
provided criminal penalties for “[w]hoever knowingly mutilates, defaces,
physically defiles, burns, maintains on the floor or ground, or tramples

125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 441–42 (1992).
Id. at 442 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 381–82 (2000).
Id. at 405–06 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 420–21 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id. at 421.
Id. at 420–21.
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upon any flag of the United States.”132 This law was struck down on its
face in United States v. Eichman by the same 5–4 vote that was recorded
in Johnson.133 The Court again concluded that the new federal law,
although wider in scope than the Texas law, still “suppresses expression
out of concern for its likely communicative impact.”134
d. Political Views of Independent Contractors
In O’Hare Truck Service, Inc. v. City of Northlake, the Court, per
Justice Kennedy, held that an independent contractor or a government
employee cannot be discriminated against by a government official or
agency because of the individual’s failure to hold certain political
views.135
2. Sexually Oriented Materials
Justice Kennedy has written several opinions limiting government
power to suppress speech by content-based prohibitions of sexually
oriented material, often finding that the government could advance its
regulation by less burdensome means, and thus the government was not
using the least burdensome effective alternative as required by strict
scrutiny review.
a. Pornography
Pornography produced by using persons under eighteen has long been
restricted. But what of pornography that simply appears to be using
minors? In Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, a majority opinion by
Justice Kennedy held that the Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996
(CPPA) was invalid under the First Amendment because its punishment
for dealing in any way with depictions of sexually explicit conduct that
appeared to be by persons under eighteen was not supported by a
sufficient connection with discouraging pedophiles from engaging in
illegal conduct.136 Justice Kennedy wrote, “First Amendment freedoms
are most in danger when the government seeks to control thought or to
justify its laws for that impermissible end. The right to think is the

132. 18 U.S.C. § 700(a)(1) (2006), invalidated by United States v. Eichman, 496
U.S. 310 (1990).
133. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310.
134. Id. at 317.
135. O’Hare Truck Serv., Inc. v. City of Northlake, 518 U.S. 712, 714–15 (1996).
136. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 258 (2002).
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beginning of freedom, and speech must be protected from the government
because speech is the beginning of thought.”137
In United States v. American Library Ass’n, the Court upheld on its
face the Children’s Internet Protection Act (CIPA).138 The CIPA required
public libraries receiving federal funds to block obscene or pornographic
computer images and to employ filters to prevent minors from accessing
such material, except when otherwise prohibited websites were being
used for bona fide research or other lawful purposes.139 Justice Kennedy
added that there might be an as-applied challenge if a library could not
disable the filter or burdened adult users’ choice to view constitutionally
protected material.140
In Reno v. ACLU, the Court—including Justice Kennedy—held that a
congressional bar on placing sexually explicit materials on the Internet
to protect minors violated the First Amendment because it had not been
shown that Congress had no adequate alternatives to this content-based
regulation.141 Thus, the law was invalid as not being the least burdensome
effective alternative, which is required under strict scrutiny review.142
b. Cable Television
In United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Justice Kennedy
wrote for a 5–4 Court that the First Amendment was violated by
requiring cable television operators whose channels were “‘primarily
dedicated to sexually-oriented programming’ . . . to ‘fully scramble or
otherwise fully block’ those channels or to limit their transmission to
hours when children [were] unlikely to be viewing,” which is what most
operators did.143 Strict scrutiny applied to this content-based rule, and
the government had not met its requirements.144 Justice Kennedy explained,
“When a plausible, less restrictive alternative is offered to a contentbased speech restriction, it is the Government’s obligation to prove that

137. Id. at 253.
138. United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194, 214 (2003).
139. Id. at 201.
140. Id. at 215 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
141. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 874–79 (1997).
142. Id.
143. United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., 529 U.S. 803, 806, 827 (2000) (quoting
47 U.S.C. § 561 (1994 & Supp. 1996)).
144. Id. at 816.
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the alternative will be ineffective to achieve its goals. The Government
has not met that burden here.”145
In Denver Area Educational Telecommunications Consortium, Inc. v.
FCC, the Court upheld an FCC rule, against a First Amendment challenge,
that permitted cable system operators to prohibit indecent programming
transmitted over leased access channels.146 On this point, Justice Kennedy
dissented, arguing that strict scrutiny should have been applied but was
not.147
3. Viewpoint Discrimination
A third area where Justice Kennedy’s approach has been significant
involves determining whether a particular government regulation involves
viewpoint discrimination. In two important viewpoint discrimination
cases, Justice Kennedy was the only Justice in the majority in both cases,
providing protection for free speech in each case.
In Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of University of Virginia, Justice
Kennedy wrote for the majority that a university that was paying the
printing costs of student publications violated the First Amendment when
it refused to fund a student magazine because it had a religious editorial
viewpoint.148 Justice Kennedy said that the university had created a
limited public forum, even though it existed “more in a metaphysical
[way] than in a spatial or geographic sense.”149 “Content discrimination,”
said Justice Kennedy, “may be permissible to preserve the purposes of
[a] limited public forum,” but “viewpoint discrimination . . . is presumed
impermissible” and triggers strict scrutiny review.150 Here the university
did not “exclude religion as a subject matter but [instead] select[ed] for
disfavored treatment those student journalistic efforts with religious
editorial viewpoints,” which “were otherwise within the approved category
of publications.”151 The refusal to fund could not be considered university
speech or merely a delimitation of its program because the university
was spending funds to encourage a diversity of views from private
speakers.152 Justice Kennedy explained:
Vital First Amendment speech principles are at stake here. The first danger to
liberty lies in granting the State the power to examine publications to
determine whether or not they are based on some ultimate idea and, if so, for
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
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Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 753 (1996).
Id. at 803–05 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 845–46 (1995).
Id. at 830.
Id.
Id. at 831.
Id. at 834.
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the State to classify them. The second, and corollary, danger is to speech from
the chilling of individual thought and expression. That danger is especially
real in the University setting, where the State acts against a background and
tradition of thought and experiment that is at the center of our intellectual and
philosophic tradition.153

Justice Kennedy also wrote the majority opinion in Legal Services
Corp. v. Velasquez.154 In Velasquez, the Court held that where the
government funds lawyers who are to speak on behalf of their clients, the
government may not foreclose advice or legal assistance questioning the
validity of statutes under the Constitution.155 Justice Kennedy explained
that a restriction operating to insulate current welfare laws from
constitutional scrutiny implicates central First Amendment concerns and
distorts the legal system.156 The government could not defend this as a
mere definition of its funding program.157
4. Laws Involving Professional and Business Speech
In cases involving professional or business speech, Justice Kennedy has
consistently supported freedom of speech concerns. For example, in
Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, Justice Kennedy announced the judgment
of the Court and wrote that although states may restrict attorney speech
that has a likelihood of prejudicing pending legal proceedings, Nevada
Supreme Court Rule 177 was void for vagueness in tending to mislead
attorneys into believing that a general discussion of a criminal defense
would not subject them to discipline.158
In Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the New York State Crime
Victims Review Board, the Court applied strict scrutiny to the “Son of
Sam” law, which required a turnover of profits from books written under

153. Id. at 835. Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer dissented, viewing
the university’s action as required in order to avoid creating an Establishment Clause
problem with the government providing financial support for religion. Id. at 863–64
(Souter, J., dissenting).
154. Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velasquez, 531 U.S. 533, 536 (2001).
155. Id. at 549.
156. Id. at 547.
157. Id. at 547–48. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, O’Connor, and
Thomas dissented, viewing the government’s action as involving government spending
of its own funds, not regulating another person’s speech, and thus subject only to
minimum rationality review. Id. at 549–50 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
158. Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1048–51 (1991).
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contract with a criminally accused or convicted person.159 The Court
struck down the law as not narrowly tailored to ensuring crime victims
were compensated from fruits of the crime.160 Justice Kennedy, concurring,
said that the fact the law was content-based was a sufficient reason to
find it invalid.161
Justice Kennedy wrote for the Court in Edenfield v. Fane that
Florida’s ban on solicitation by certified public accountants was
unsupported by evidence that such solicitations were likely to lead to
oppressive conduct or to the false or misleading claims that the State was
pursuing.162 Thus, the content-based regulation did not satisfy the test
applicable to commercial speech regulation articulated in Central
Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission.163 Similarly,
in Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, the Court held that a state’s bar on
tobacco advertising outdoors and at the point of sale failed the Central
Hudson analysis.164 Justice Kennedy, concurring, said that in his view
the Central Hudson test “gives insufficient protection to truthful,
nonmisleading commercial speech,” and that strict scrutiny should be
applied in these cases and not the intermediate Central Hudson test.165
In Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., Justice Kennedy nonetheless applied the
Central Hudson test to hold a state statute unconstitutional that barred
the sale of pharmacy records that revealed the prescribing practices of
individual doctors.166 Justice Kennedy said that the state has a substantial
goal of improving the health of individuals seeking health care, but that
this goal could not be regarded as being directly advanced by placing
limits on the ability of interested parties to gain information that would
enable them to communicate more effectively with doctors.167
In United States v. United Foods, Inc., Justice Kennedy wrote for the
Court that fundamental First Amendment rights of mushroom growers
were violated by federal assessments for general ads about mushrooms
where the ads were not part of some broader regulatory scheme.168

159. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Review
Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 123 (1991).
160. Id. at 123.
161. Id. at 124 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
162. Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 771–73 (1993).
163. Id. at 768–73 (citing Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm’n,
447 U.S. 557, 564 (1980)).
164. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 561, 567 (2001).
165. Id. at 571–72 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
166. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2659 (2011).
167. Id. at 2670–72.
168. United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 410–16 (2001).
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Instead, the ads had the effect of coercing individuals to join in messages
with which they might not agree.169
In Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Ass’n, the Court held that a beef
promotion ad was government speech, and beef producers whose
assessments were used to finance the ad had no First Amendment
protection.170 Justice Kennedy, dissenting, said the speech was not
clearly identified as by the government, and the government could not
justifiably use a compelled subsidy to fund speech unless it put that
speech forward as its own.171
B. Opinions in Which Justice Kennedy Voted To
Uphold a Regulation
1. Elections
In Burson v. Freeman, the Court held that on election day, a state
could “prohibit[] the solicitation of votes and the display or distribution
of campaign materials within 100 feet of the entrance to a polling
place.”172 Concurring, Justice Kennedy said that this was one of the
narrow areas where a content-based proscription of speech in a public
forum could be justified because “[v]oting is one of the most fundamental
and cherished liberties in our democratic system,” and in this case the
state is not trying to “suppress legitimate expression.”173
2. Retaliation for Speech by a Government Employee
In Garcetti v. Ceballos, Justice Kennedy wrote a majority opinion that
refused to give First Amendment protection from retaliatory employment
action for what a government employee said in a memorandum prepared
as part of his duties.174 Justice Kennedy explained that “[s]o long as
[government] employees are speaking as citizens [on] matters of public
[interest], they . . . face only those speech restrictions that are necessary
for their employers to operate efficiently and effectively.”175 But they

169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

Id. at 410–11.
Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 566–67 (2005).
Id. at 570 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 193, 211 (1992).
Id. at 214 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006).
Id. at 419.

717

give up some First Amendment protection when they agree to be
employed by the government, and they are not speaking as citizens on
matters of public interest when they are carrying out their job duties.176
In Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, Justice Kennedy wrote for the Court
that the same standard of First Amendment review applies to a grievance
filed by a government worker under the Petition Clause of the First
Amendment as in a standard First Amendment free speech case.177
3. Libel
In Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., Justice Kennedy wrote for
the Court that an author, who was the plaintiff in a libel action, was not
entitled to a summary judgment in his action against a magazine.178
Justice Kennedy said there was an issue of whether the defendant’s
publication was false for the purpose of proving the actual malice needed
to overcome the protection given to writers by the First Amendment.179
Here, although the plaintiff was not entitled to a summary judgment, a
reasonable jury could find that there was evidence of deliberate or
reckless falsification since the quotations attributed to the plaintiff
differed materially from the plaintiff’s tape-recorded statements.180
4. Zoning of Adult Establishments
In City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., the Court held that an
ordinance that barred more than one adult entertainment business in the
same building could survive a motion for summary judgment filed by
challengers.181 Concurring in the judgment, Justice Kennedy reacted to
an indication that the Court might apply less than strict scrutiny in
reviewing the ordinance.182 He insisted that the Court should use
intermediate scrutiny only if the government could “advance some basis
to show that its regulation ha[d] the purpose and effect of suppressing
secondary effects, while leaving the quantity and accessibility of speech
substantially intact.”183

176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
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Id. at 418–21.
Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. 2488, 2495 (2011).
Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 499 (1991).
Id.
Id. at 520–25.
City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 443 (2002).
Id. at 447 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id. at 449.
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V. CONTENT-NEUTRAL REGULATIONS
A. Opinions in Which Justice Kennedy Voted To
Uphold the Regulation
In the vast majority of cases, Justice Kennedy has written an opinion
indicating support for upholding a content-neutral regulation of speech.
He has tested such regulations by intermediate scrutiny and typically
found that the government had satisfactorily shown that the law and its
application served a substantial government interest unrelated to speech,
had left ample alternative channels of communication, and thus was not
substantially overbroad.
These cases indicate that where content-based regulations are not
involved, Justice Kennedy is willing to let the government regulate for
non-content-based reasons. However, his concern for free speech values
are indicated in a number of these cases where Justice Kennedy has
written to limit the Court’s holding.
1. Elections
In New York State Board of Elections v. Lopez Torres, the Court
upheld New York’s content-neutral convention system for nominating
state supreme court justices, saying it gave potential candidates a fair
shot.184 Justice Kennedy, concurring, said it was important that New
York had “a second mechanism for placement on the final election
ballot,” which involved qualifying by a reasonable petition process.185
2. Student Regulations
In Board of Regents v. Southworth, Justice Kennedy wrote for the
Court that “[t]he First Amendment permits a public university to charge
its students an activity fee [to be] used to fund . . . extracurricular student
speech,” but only because the program was viewpoint neutral in its
allocations.186
In Morse v. Frederick, the Supreme Court indicated that minimum
rationality review would be applied to student speech made in the context
of the nonpublic forum of a “school-sanctioned and school-supervised
184.
185.
186.

N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. Lopez Torres, 552 U.S. 196, 208–09 (2008).
Id. at 210 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Bd. of Regents v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 221 (2000).
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event,” and the school had a legitimate interest in regulating speech that
could rationally be viewed as promoting illegal drug use.187 A concurrence
by Justice Alito, joined by Justice Kennedy, whose votes were critical to
make up the majority, indicated that where the speech is not connected
to the school curriculum and is student generated, even if in conflict with
the “educational mission” of the school—however broadly defined—
then the Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District
test would apply.188 Tinker reflects an intermediate standard of review
for content-neutral regulations in a public forum.189
3. Cable Television
Must-carry provisions regarding cable television were ruled contentneutral in Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, in an opinion by
Justice Kennedy.190 Since they were content-neutral and aimed only at
protecting access to free television programming for the forty percent of
Americans without cable, the laws were reviewed by the intermediate
level of scrutiny.191 The government was required to show only that
they were genuinely needed to protect local broadcasting.192 Because
the government had not made even that showing, the case was remanded
for the district court to determine what harms local broadcasters would
suffer without must-carry laws and what harms cable would suffer with
them.193
When Turner returned following remand, Justice Kennedy delivered
the opinion of the Court, which upheld the district court opinion requiring
cable television stations to carry the programs of local commercial
television stations.194 Justice Kennedy agreed with the district court that
Congress had drawn reasonable inferences from the substantial evidence
before it to conclude that in the absence of must-carry rules, significant
numbers of broadcast stations would be refused carriage.195 Thus, the

187. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 396, 408–10 (2007).
188. Id. at 422–25 (Alito, J., concurring) (citing Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty.
Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506, 514 (1969)).
189. Id. at 425 (citing Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508–09) (noting that under Tinker the
school must show concern about a “substantial disruption” of the school environment,
which reflects the intermediate review requirement of a substantial government interest
to regulate).
190. Turner Broad. Sys. Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 652 (1994).
191. Id. at 661–63.
192. Id. at 664.
193. Id. at 667–68.
194. Turner Broad. Sys. Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 185 (1997).
195. Id. at 196, 201–02.
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must-carry provisions did not burden substantially more speech than
necessary to further a substantial government interest.196
4. Other Cases
As previously discussed,197 Justice Kennedy wrote for the Court in
Ward v. Rock Against Racism that requiring concert performers in
Central Park to use government-supplied sound technicians was contentneutral and needed only intermediate scrutiny.198 The city did not have
to prove that its regulation was the least intrusive means of furthering its
goal of protecting citizens from unwelcome noise.199 It was sufficient
that the city’s means used to control sound volume to protect residential
privacy and prevent noise pollution were not “substantially broader than
necessary” to achieve the city’s ends.200 Critical to this conclusion,
however, was the fact that the city’s regulation did not interfere with the
performer’s desired sound mix, and thus was not content-based.201
In Christian Legal Society Chapter of the University of California,
Hastings College of the Law v. Martinez, a 5–4 majority upheld a
university’s policy of supporting student organizations only if they
accepted all students because it was reasonable and viewpoint neutral.202
Justice Kennedy said that if the challenging student organization could
enforce its membership policy of requiring members to uphold certain
religious beliefs, then that would conflict with the university’s legitimate
purpose in creating a limited forum to encourage vibrant dialogue between
students.203 Given this educational purpose, and Justice Kennedy’s general
support for the teaching and learning aspect of free speech doctrine, the
university’s limitation on free speech was constitutional in this narrow
setting.204

196. Id. at 215–16.
197. See supra text accompanying notes 46–50.
198. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).
199. Id. at 789–90.
200. Id. at 802 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Members of the City
Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 808 (1984)).
201. Id. at 801–02.
202. Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of the Law
v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2994–95 (2010).
203. Id. at 2999–3000 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
204. Id.
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B. Opinions in Which Justice Kennedy Voted To
Void the Regulation
Despite Justice Kennedy’s usual support for content-neutral
regulations of speech, sometimes the government regulation cannot survive
intermediate review. For example, as discussed earlier,205 in International
Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, Justice Kennedy concurred
with a judgment invalidating an airport regulation preventing a group
from handing out leaflets in an airport.206 Justice Kennedy found the ban
on distributing leaflets invalid because any danger with disrupting free
flow of movement of persons in the airport terminal was not substantial
enough to satisfy intermediate review.207 In addition, ample alternative
channels for solicitation did not exist.208
In some cases, where the Court had concluded that the regulation was
content-neutral, Justice Kennedy disagreed and concluded that the
regulation was in fact content-based. For example, in Hill v. Colorado,
the Court found that a statute that affected abortion protesters was content
neutral.209 In contrast, Justice Kennedy said that the Court should break
through the form of a speech regulation to the reality, present here, that
only one side of the abortion debate was being regulated.210 Thus, the
law was actually content-based and should be given strict scrutiny.211
VI. CONCLUSION
Justice Kennedy’s basic principles in free speech cases are supporting
political freedom, supporting individual autonomy, and protecting freedom
to teach, learn, and innovate. Given these principles, his opinions in free
speech cases protect free speech from government regulation unless the
government can provide strong reasons for any restrictive action and
show that the means it has chosen to carry out its purposes are closely
tailored to its goals. At a minimum, judicial review is by strict scrutiny
for content-based regulations and intermediate review for content-neutral
time, place, and manner regulations. In some cases, Justice Kennedy has
indicated a preference for a stronger, absolute rule of unconstitutionality
for content-based regulations that do not fall into one of the traditional
exceptions of free speech doctrine, such as obscenity, defamation, words
205. See supra text accompanying notes 67–75.
206. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 702–03
(1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
207. Id. at 702.
208. Id. at 702–03.
209. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 723 (2000).
210. Id. at 768 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
211. Id. at 768–70.
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tantamount to an act otherwise criminal, impairing some other
constitutional right, an incitement to lawless action, or speech calculated
to bring about imminent harm that the state has substantive power to
regulate. Given his entire body of decisions regarding the freedom of
speech over his quarter century on the Court, no Justice on the modern
Court has been more consistently protective of the First Amendment
freedom of speech than Justice Kennedy.
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